House of War

Bill Roggio has an timely and in-depth analysis of Iranian involvement in the Iraqi insurgency via the Ramazan Corps, Qods Force’s operational command in Iraq. The Ramazan Corps provides arms, advice and basic training, distributed along a series of “ratlines” that run into the country from Iran’s western border.

Inside Iran, Qods Force manufactures and distributes weapons, provides training for Iraqi recruits, then facilitates the movement of weapons and fighters inside Iraq. Iraqi recruits, largely radicalized Shia from Muqtada al Sadr’s Mahdi Army, are sent to Iran for what one US military officer described as “basic jihadi training.” The recruits receive several weeks of training with small arms and, depending on the units assigned, mortars and the use of explosively formed penetrators, or EFPs.

American commanders also dispute reports that Iran has reduced its involvement in Iraq, and that it has helped to curb the violence:

“I don’t know what this Iranian pledge is, but the number of munitions has increased,” Lynch said on November 11. “It could be that we are finding them more. But it is still troublesome. I have no idea when these EFP munitions came … before or after the pledge. I don’t know.”

Arnold Kling, drawing on the work of Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast, says in a January 2007 article for TCS that Iraq “under Saddam Hussein was a limited-access order, or “natural state.” And, furthermore, that “Iraq was never on the “doorstep” of becoming an open-access order.”

His analysis uses a model of macro-socio-economic development that begins with the simplest type of hunter-gatherer societies, referred to as “primitive orders”, progresses through “limited access orders” or “natural states”, the first and most enduring civilisational mode, and finishes with the historically recent advance of “open access orders”. A “limited access order” is North et al’s term for a society that “strictly limits access to positions of power within political, economic, and religious systems.” An “open access order”, on the other hand, is a society “characterized by open political and economic competition, rather than the limited political and economic privileges enjoyed solely by elites in natural states.” Transition between the two is rare (Spain, Ireland and Taiwan are some of the latest), because “the state’s foremost task is securing its own survival”, and so it feels the process of change as a threat to its very existence – and the existence of the elites it serves – which, of course, it is.

For that reason, Kling concludes that the US will never succeed “in its objective of establishing an open-access order in Iraq.” At present, the country is barely any kind of order, limited access or otherwise, and the thought of creating a liberal democracy with a vibrant market economy seems faintly ridiculous, certainly premature. Start with a limited access order, he advises, which can provide security and can establish and consolidate the necessary preliminary stage of economic development. Without the self-interest of an elite who feel that they have “a stake in peace”, Iraq will stall and remain a failed state.

I have previously wondered whether it is wise to be resuscitating, or helping to resuscitate, ethnic, tribal identities to shore up the fall-out from the destruction of the Iraqi state. Perhaps we are simply facilitating, entrenching and developing sectarianism. However, the implications of Kling’s article are that progression to a democratic market economy is impossible without first developing as a natural state, as unpalatable as that may be to westerners. “The perfect is the enemy of the good,” and as such we will have to give elites preferential access to political and economic power, or deny them at the cost of state failure and realising Iraq’s potential as an eventual open access order.

Robert Kaplan wrote a recent op-ed for The Atlantic, in which he noted that,

Iraq has had three elections that have led to chaos. Bringing society out of that chaos has meant a recourse not to laws or a constitution, but to blood ties. The Anbar Awakening has been a rebuff not only to the extremism of al-Qaeda, but to democracy itself. Restoring peace in Anbar has been accomplished by a lot of money changing hands, to the benefit of unelected but well-respected tribal sheikhs, paid off with cash and projects by our soldiers and marines. Progress in Iraq means erecting not a parliamentary system, but a balance of fear among tribes and sectarian groups.

It seems that a year since Kling wrote “Iraq’s Natural State” in TCS, the US military is acting out his suggestions. Petraeus, and the new COIN-as-anthropology approach he implemented, seeks to work with the grain of existing cultures rather than attempting to impose new rule-sets from the top down. As the natural state develops out of the centralisation of power in the hands of dominant groups, a natural state is precisely what is developing in Iraq with the empowerment of the tribes. Given a stake in the maintenance of order, i.e. they feel they have more to gain by participating, they uphold the state.

Perhaps this might even aid the state moving up the order-type value chain. Pluralism or plurality of access to economic and political power is, after all, part of what makes open access orders what they are. Such a situation is doubtless more fragile – Saddam found it easier to be a tyrant than the US is finding it to be a liberator – but also more worthwhile: for greater risk (and associated cost), there is greater return.

The still unanswered question is whether the various tribal powers, religious factions and ethnic groups can all be reconciled to the natural state of Iraq. Can be power be centralised and dispersed at the same time? Federalism is probably the most realistic and sustainable solution.

Reading the recent exchange between Noah Shactman and Tom Barnett, it seems to me that both are right in some sense, or at least, both have useful contributions to make.

Shactman’s thesis (published in WIRED) is only partially explained by its title: How Technology Almost Lost the War: In Iraq, the Critical Networks Are Social — Not Electronic. In the article he describes how the focus of the American military, as an institution, on fighting large, WWII-scale battles against peer (or almost peer) opposition armed forces, occluded them and left them unable to recognise or divine the looming mess of post-conflict Iraq urban insurrection.

Except, that’s not quite what he says. It’s probably what he should have said, but as Tom Barnett points out, Shactman’s article, in effect, excuses the US Administration for any mistakes made or lack of foresight, and instead blames it all on… Arthur Cebrowski, John Garstka and the theory of Network Centric Warfare as they developed it.

However, although he initially proposes a strangely simplified dichotomy (further reduced by me to 4GW vs. NCW), as the piece progresses the two supposedly opposing sides don’t seem quite so exclusive. For instance, though Shactman is unimpressed by the Fourth Division’s ultra-modern telecommunications and networked tracking systems, the actual users appear to feel differently. “No commander at his level has ever been able to see so many of his men so easily. “It increases the unit’s combat power, no question,” Prior says.” The potential of the NCW doctrine is ignored, even as its successes are recounted: “When the US went to war in Afghanistan, and then in Iraq, its forces achieved apparent victory with lightning speed.” Garstka even tells him directly that “you have your social networks and technological networks. You need to have both.” But Shactman either can’t see the obvious positive uses for the networked, advanced-tech, quantitative analysis approach which emerge from his writing or, perhaps more probably, doesn’t want to because it contradicts his idea.

It’s almost funny when Shactman interviews Petraeus towards the article’s end. “I’m expecting a frontal assault on network-centric warfare,” he writes. “Instead, he sings me a love song.”

Zenpundit sums it up well:

The crux of the problem with Shachtman’s article is that his opener gives the impression that the botching of the occupation in Iraq should be laid at the door of two men who articulated strategic ideas with impressive intellectual celerity and subtlety, one of whom is no longer able to defend himself.

Indeed, Shactman would do better to look at institutions rather than an idea because,

whenever a theory is accepted by a large and powerful bureaucratic organization- like, say, the Pentagon - it collides with reality.

We certainly hope so (from The Financial Times):

Violence in Iraq has fallen at a rate that has surprised military commanders and even one of the architects of the “surge” that boosted US troop numbers in the country this year, according to figures gathered by the US.

The figures show the numbers of suicide attacks, roadside bombings, mortar and other attacks on US forces and on the Iraqi population have more than halved since 30,000 extra troops in June.

The military attributes the decline to the surge, the spread of local ceasefire deals across Iraq, a ceasefire by radical Shia militias and an improvement in the Iraqi security forces.

Jack Keane, the former army general who helped persuade George W. Bush, US president, to increase troop numbers in Iraq, said the decrease in violence was “phenomenal” and had occurred far faster than he had expected.

“When you understand you are dealing with the complexity of a counter-insurgency operation which can take years to resolve, to have this dramatic a success in a short period of time, it’s unprecedented,” he said.

The US military says the number of civilian deaths has also fallen 60 per cent since the surge took effect, with a drop of 75 per cent in Baghdad. According to icasualties.org, the average monthly US death toll dropped from 96 for the first half of 2007 to 66 in the past four months. The average monthly death toll for Iraqi civilians and security forces has dropped from 2,157 to 1,223 in the same period….

General Petraeus reports to Congress:

As a bottom line up front, the military objectives of the surge are, in large measure, being met. In recent months, in the face of tough enemies and the brutal summer heat of Iraq, Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces have achieved progress in the security arena. Though the improvements have been uneven across Iraq, the overall number of security incidents in Iraq has declined in 8 of the past 12 weeks, with the numbers of incidents in the last two weeks at the lowest levels seen since June 2006.

One reason for the decline in incidents is that Coalition and Iraqi forces have dealt significant blows to Al Qaeda-Iraq. Though Al Qaeda and its affiliates in Iraq remain dangerous, we have taken away a number of their sanctuaries and gained the initiative in many areas.

We have also disrupted Shia militia extremists, capturing the head and numerous other leaders of the Iranian-supported Special Groups, along with a senior Lebanese Hezbollah operative supporting Iran’s activities in Iraq.

Coalition and Iraqi operations have helped reduce ethno-sectarian violence, as well, bringing down the number of ethno-sectarian deaths substantially in Baghdad and across Iraq since the height of the sectarian violence last December. The number of overall civilian deaths has also declined during this period, although the numbers in each area are still at troubling levels.

Iraqi Security Forces have also continued to grow and to shoulder more of the load, albeit slowly and amid continuing concerns about the sectarian tendencies of some elements in their ranks. In general, however, Iraqi elements have been standing and fighting and sustaining tough losses, and they have taken the lead in operations in many areas.

Additionally, in what may be the most significant development of the past 8 months, the tribal rejection of Al Qaeda that started in Anbar Province and helped produce such significant change there has now spread to a number of other locations as well….

The post at SWJ includes the full transcript and briefing slides for both General Petraeus’ and Ambassador Crocker’s Congressional testimonies.

Additional Assessment:

Col. Pat Lang - Petraeus and Crocker - Intersting

B. Smith & J. Martin - The Candidates Respond to Petraeus

E.J. Dionne - The Surge Has Succeeded… in Washington

Michael Yon - Don’t Ask Me What I Think about the Petraeus Report

Thomas P.M. Barnett - Petraeus’ report was everything we were told it would be

Karen DeYoung & Thomas Ricks - The General’s Long View Could Cut Withdrawal Debate Short

Jonathan Rauch - Be Angry… but Patient

Jacob Laksin - Surgin’ General

Frederick W. Kagan - No Middle Way

Tony Bey - Gen. Petraeus on Iran, Hezbollah and Syria in Iraq

The Times editorial - Listen to Petraeus

Gerard Baker - General Petraeus polarises Washington

Babak Dehghanpisheh & John Barry - The Brains Behind the Petraeus Iraq Report

There are plenty of things to be depressed about, at present. However, there are occasional chinks of light amidst the darkness. Here are two:

Dave Kilcullen

Thomas P.M. Barnett

GlobalTerrorAlert have posted the translation of an interview with a foreign jihadist, fighting for al Qaeda’s “Islamic State of Iraq”. The interview was originally streamed live via a radical Arabic chatroom on Paltalk and features Abu Adam al-Maqdisi, a Palestinian national.

Al-Maqdisi discusses the global Salafi jihad, local operations and of particular interest to 4GW and 5GW conoisseurs, the propaganda machine of the ISI, describing “brothers” who disseminate Islamist ideology on CDs and video tapes, copying “around 500 - 600 per day”. He also states that his comrades stay in contact with each other and with the larger struggle via internent chatrooms. The contrast between the ISI’s exploitation of New Media and the United States Armed Forces’ self-harming censorship of its own troops could not be more striking. (Via Counterterrorism Blog)